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Abstract— In this paper we consider the application of 
Stackelberg game theory to model discretionary lane-changing in 
lightly congested highway setting. The fundamental intent of this 
model, which is parameterized to capture driver disposition 
(aggressiveness or inattentiveness), is to help with the development 
of decision-making strategies for autonomous vehicles in ways that 
are mindful of how human drivers perform the same function on 
the road (on which have reported elsewhere.) This paper, however, 
focuses only on the model development and the respective 
qualitative assessment. This is accomplished in unit test simulations 
as well as in bulk mode (i.e. using the Monte Carlo methodology), 
via a limited traffic micro-simulation compared against the 
NHTSA 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Safety data. In particular, a 
qualitative comparison shows the relative consistency of the 
proposed model with human decision-making in terms of 
producing qualitatively similar proportions of crashes and near 
crashes as a function of driver inattentiveness (or aggressiveness). 
While this result by itself does not offer a true quantitative 
validation of the proposed model, it does demonstrate the utility of 
the proposed approach in modeling discretionary lane-changing 
and may therefore be of use in autonomous driving in a manner 
that is consistent with human decision making on the road. 
Index Terms— Game theory, driver modeling, discretionary lane-
changing, naturalistic driving, autonomous vehicles 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Understanding human driving behavior in ordinary traffic 
has been a crucial topic in traffic safety and efficiency [1, 2]. 
To this end, researchers have developed a number of models 
that are meant to capture the behavior of drivers on the road [3-
5]. These studies have revealed a number of factors, including 
driver intent and disposition (e.g. 
aggressiveness/inattentiveness) as well as traffic setting and 
roadway conditions that exert strong influences on the driver 
reaction and subsequently impact his/her decision-making 
process. In particular, drivers choose lanes, vary their speed and 
maintain headway based on their level of 
aggressiveness/inattentiveness and their perception of the 
surrounding vehicles’ behaviors [6].  
In this context, there are two main aspects to human driving: 
car-following in the longitudinal direction [7, 8] and lane-
changing in multi-lane situations [5, 9]. To this end, researchers 
have provided a range of car-following models whose goal has 
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been to produce an adequate representation of the acceleration 
characteristics of vehicles [3, 7, 8]. For instance, the well-
known Intelligent Driver Model (IDM) produces acceleration 
as a continuous function of the subject vehicle’s velocity, 
velocity difference relative to the lead vehicle, and current and 
desired headway [3]. Recent works have attempted to adapt 
these models to reflect certain human attributes, such as delayed 
recognition of the visual field and neuromuscular response of 
drivers [10, 11].  
Lane-changing behavior has also been actively studied by a 
growing number of researchers [9, 12-14]. These works have 
focused on revealing the heuristics of lane-changing as the basis 
to create effective traffic flow modeling tools as well as to 
develop autonomous driving strategies. Gipps [12], for 
instance, has defined a set of factors that cause the driver to 
change lanes, including headway, speed and proximity to the 
desired exit ramp. Ahmed [9], among others, has utilized a gap 
acceptance model to assess if an adjacent gap is acceptable for 
lane-changing purposes. Likewise, Hidas [13] has proposed the 
notion of driver courtesy, a type of cooperation among drivers, 
in modeling lane-change and merging operations. Kim [14] has 
proposed a modified IDM to deal with conflicts among a group 
of vehicles when there is not a sufficient gap to merge and, in  
this respect, is similar to the forced merging model or Hidas’s 
driver courtesy scheme.  
In addition, Swaroop and Yoon have developed an 
emergency lane-change maneuver in response to the presence 
of obstacles within the overall framework of vehicle platooning 
[15] while Jula et al. have performed an analysis on the 
kinematics of lane-changing maneuvers and presented a 
minimum longitudinal spacing criterion to avoid crashes [16]. 
Kanaris and Ioannou have also proposed a certain minimum 
safety spacing for lane-changing and merging in automated 
highway systems [17].  
These models all aim at a safe lane-changing approach. 
However, aggressiveness and inattentiveness are also important 
factors that affect driver behavior and subsequently impact 
traffic safety [18, 19]. In this context, we realize that 
aggressiveness and inattentiveness are not exactly the same 
factors. Neither do we claim that inattentiveness and the 
broader issue of driver distraction are the same factors. Indeed 
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distraction can be considered a temporal mode of behavior that 
while potentially serious, once the source of distraction is 
removed, the driver returns to a normal state. In this paper, 
inattentiveness is considered a dispositional mode that, as with 
aggressiveness, is sustained over a longer period. As noted 
above, however, we do not claim that the two are precisely the 
same dispositions. We believe that in certain instances 
inattentiveness and aggressiveness may manifest themselves 
similarly, however, as when an inattentive/aggressive driver 
changes lanes irrespective of limited spacing in the target lane. 
There are also instances where these factors do not produce 
similar behaviors as for instance in maintaining headway. 
However, even in this case the behaviors may be similar in 
certain instances as in aggressive tailgating vs. maintaining a 
small headway by simply being inattentive. All said, one could 
argue that inattentiveness may be viewed in certain respect as a 
purpose-less aggressiveness (or behaviorally similar to it albeit 
with less intent.) In fact, while medical facts are not necessarily 
certain, certain studies relate inattentiveness and 
aggressiveness, although the relation of these studies to driver 
behavior modeling is not fully established [20]. 
Aside from aggressiveness/inattentiveness, a number of 
researchers have studied other factors that influence the driving 
behavior (such as gender and age) based on observational data 
[21, 22]. However, existing human driver models that are 
utilized in both traffic flow modeling and in autonomous 
driving have generally assumed nominal behavior as well as 
reasonable perception-action models, which may not be 
uniformly held across the spectrum of drivers and driving 
conditions [4, 23].  
With this in mind, in the present work we consider a 
somewhat broader range of driving behaviors, particularly 
variations in aggressiveness/attentiveness or limitations of 
perception (mainly in terms of assessment of visual field), 
towards building a driver decision model with some utility in 
autonomous driving as noted in our related work [24] and 
further outlined in the concluding section of the paper. The 
qualitative validation that is offered in this work, however, 
focuses on a set of limited traffic simulations, which provide a 
better venue to illustrate the performance of the model and offer 
an intuitive assessment of it. The purpose of this assessment or 
validation process is not, however, to show the efficacy of the 
approach in exact quantification of the impact of driver 
aggressiveness or inattentiveness (or limitations of visual 
perception) on the traffic flow. Rather, this qualitative 
assessment or validation is intended to offer a basis for using 
the proposed approach in developing intuitively reasonable 
decision logics for autonomous driving, realizing that such 
logics do need to be validated rigorously in their own setting as 
our continued work on this topic is presently focused on. 
A. Game Theory 
Since its inception by Borel in the 1920s [25, 26] and 
subsequent works by Von Neumann and Morgenstern as well 
as by Nash [27, 28], game theory has been used as a reasonable 
model of decision-making in many areas of social science 
(particularly economics) and engineering [27-34]. In particular, 
Fisk [35] has pointed out that two behavioral models from game 
theory can be used in transportation modeling, as for instance 
in intercity travel and signal optimization. Optimality in this 
context is evaluated on the basis of payoffs resulting from the 
decisions by (and interactions among) the respective 
participants [36]. The Nash game delivers the optimal solution 
in non-cooperative games in general [29]. On the other hand, 
the Stackelberg game guarantees the best payoff for every 
player when there exists a hierarchical structure among players, 
namely when players are divided into a leader, who has the 
power to choose his/her strategy first, and a follower, who 
should choose his/her action after the leader’s decision has been 
made [30, 31]. In this context we should point out that the 
Stackelberg model does not require a physical precedence order 
(although this may indeed be the case in driving), only that there 
is a play order in the sense that the lead player does have a 
priority in action as is the case in discretionary lane-changing 
in that, typically, one driver considers making a lane change in 
view of the current traffic state and must assess what the others 
would do in response and subsequently take action at which 
point others will slow down to allow the driver to change lanes 
or maintain their speeds/accelerate to prevent such a lane 
change. We shall discuss this issue further in the later sections 
of this paper. 
B. Game Theory in Transportation 
Game theory has been applied in various ways to study the 
effects of policy, decisions, and/or the actions of individual 
agents in transportation system. These studies can be broadly 
classified into two categories: infrastructural regulation studies 
(traffic control problem) and agent-oriented studies (vehicle 
placement or route decisions). In the first category, researchers 
have employed game theory on dynamic traffic control or 
assignment problems. For instance, Chen and Ben-Akiva [37] 
adopted a non-cooperative game model to study the interaction 
between a traffic regulation system and traffic flow to optimally 
regulate the flow on a highway or an intersection while Li and 
Chen [33] addressed the ramp-metering problem via 
Stackelberg game theory. Su et al. [38] have also used game 
theory to simulate the evolution of a traffic network.  
In the second category vehicles are regarded as game 
participants and traffic rules are generally considered to be 
implicit in the respective decision models [32, 34, 39]. In this 
context Kita [40] has worked to address the merging-giveway 
interaction between a through car and a merging car as a two-
person non-zero sum non-cooperative game. This approach can 
be regarded as a game theoretic interpretation of Hidas’ driver 
courtesy scheme [6] from the viewpoint that the vehicles share 
the payoffs or heuristics of the lane-changing process. This 
leads to a reasonable traffic model although the approach does 
not address the uncertainties resulting from the actions of other 
drivers. Moreover, one cannot guarantee that the competing 
vehicle would act as determined by the game solution since that 
vehicle may be able to consider other factors that the subject 
vehicle cannot take into account. 
In recent studies Talebpour et al [41, 42] have considered the 
notion of incomplete information as part of the game 
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formulation process and have developed a model that in certain 
respects addresses the aforementioned concern. Likewise, 
Altendorf and Flemisch [43] have developed a game theoretic 
model that addresses the issue of risk-taking by drivers and its 
impact on the traffic flow. Their study focuses on the cognitive 
aspects of this decision making process and its impact on traffic 
safety. Likewise, Wang, et al. [44] have used a differential game 
based controller to control a given vehicle’s car-following and 
lane-changing behavior while in [45], the authors have applied 
an Iterative Snow-Drift (ISD) game on cross-a-crossing 
scenario. In [46] Stackelberg game theory was used solve 
conflicts in shared space zones while in [47] the authors 
compared heavy vehicle and passenger car lane-changing 
maneuvers on arterial roads and freeways. Note that (Elvik [48] 
offers a rather complete review of related works in this area but 
only up to 2014 while the literature in this area continues to 
evolve.) 
In summary, the studies listed above have worked to address 
the problem of contention in driving particularly as it relates to 
lane-changing and its impact on the traffic flow. The present 
work is inline with these studies but provides a rather detailed 
description of driver behavior while incorporating a simplified 
vehicle dynamic model, and attempts to show the utility of 
game theory in modeling the types of behaviors that impact 
traffic flow. More relevant to the current debate in autonomous 
driving, this model offers a potential approach to implementing 
an intuitive decision logic that is consistent with the behavioral 
aspects of ordinary human drivers and therefore offers a 
potentially sensible approach to implementing naturalistic 
autonomous driving strategies for use in mixed-traffic where 
the behavior of autonomous vehicles must remain consistent 
with common driving norms. 
C. Premise and Contribution of the Current Work 
In this paper, we develop an individual driver decision model 
based on Stackelberg game theory, which is pertinent to 
discretionary lane-changing. The premise here is that, the 
sequential structure of decision making in discretionary lane-
changing is best represented by the Stackelberg game theory 
where the driver attempting the lane change has the lead role in 
terms of initiating the chain of decisions that may subsequently 
involve other vehicles (to give way, to compete and/or to 
execute subsequent lane changes of their own). In the present 
work, this theory is combined with a simplified vehicle 
dynamic model to develop a simulation model to evaluate the 
impact of driver decisions in discretionary lane-changing. 
(Mandatory lane-changing such as in highway merging is 
considered in a separate work [49].) Moreover, we pay attention 
to unsafe outcomes that can be caused by the driver’s behavioral 
dispositions such as aggressiveness or inattentiveness. This is 
done in the definitions of the so-called payoffs associated with 
the game theoretic approach.  
The model is intuitively validated in unit tests and via Monte 
Carlo simulations, which correlate the possibility of collision 
with the level of aggressiveness/inattentiveness of drivers as 
well as inter-vehicular distances. This validation step has been 
the basis for the use of this model in developing an intuitive 
decision logic for autonomous vehicles in mixed traffic as 
reported elsewhere [24], and may also support driver education 
campaigns and transportation policy analysis. 
D. Organization of the paper 
This paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the 
configurations of the problem at hand. Section III gives a 
formulation of traffic situation via Stackelberg game theory, 
discusses utility design for simulating driver behavior, and 
presents the solution of the game theoretic formulation. Section 
IV offers unit test results, which are organized as a collision 
possibility model. A limited traffic flow simulation is 
subsequently performed to qualitatively assess the effectiveness 
of the collision possibility model in bulk mode. In Section V a 
summary of our results is provided and conclusions are drawn 
with respect to further development of the proposed model. 
II. SYSTEM CONFIGURATION 
The traffic situation considered here consists of three 
components: the traffic regulation system, the traffic setting, 
and the vehicle itself, which includes a driver. In this work, 
normal traffic rules such as speed limits are assumed to exist 
although these are not subject to game theoretic analysis. (They 
are implicitly considered in the modeling process and 
incorporated in the simulation studies.) A simple perception 
model captures the driving setting in terms of the positions of 
surrounding vehicles in view of the driver’s perceptual limits 
(perhaps affected by age or other factors) and reflected in the 
decision logic and in the decision logic. The driver’s decision 
model or logic i.e. where to go or which vehicle to follow, is 
based on Stackelberg game theory. This model does not 
generate the actual vehicle motion trajectories (be it in the same 
lane or during lane-changes.) Smooth trajectories are separately 
generated in view of physical limits of the vehicle (e.g. 
acceleration/deceleration rates) while steering and speed are 
managed via proportional plus derivative controllers. The 
vehicle dynamic model in turn translates these inputs into 
vehicle performance variables, namely velocity, position, and 
the yaw rate of the vehicle. 
A. Perception model 
This function classifies the given vehicle’s surroundings into 
leading and following vehicles, according to their longitudinal 
positions in each lane. In reality, vicinity recognition can 
degenerate due to internal and/or external conditions. In this 
paper, we focus on the internal factors, although external 
conditions such as weather can also be incorporated in the 
modeling process. At present, however, these are not explicitly 
considered but may be to a certain degree lumped under the 
overall perceptual limit factor discussed shortly. To this end, we 
add artificial errors to approximate the uncertainty in 
recognizing the surroundings. This is described in more detail 
shortly. 
B. Vehicle Control 
The goal of this function is to precisely execute the driver’s 
decision, be it to maintain lane position or to conduct a lane-
change. Subsequent to a simple smooth trajectory generation 
process, two proportional plus derivative (PD) controllers are 
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used to reproduce the driver’s low-level controls of headway or 
speed as well as steering angle in consideration of the lane-
change trajectory. Once again, both longitudinal and lateral 
controllers are limited by physical factors (acceleration limits, 
cornering stiffness values) and additional parameters that 
express the driver’s disposition. That is to say, an aggressive (or 
in certain instance an inattentive) driver will may produce more 
drastic longitudinal and lateral accelerations than a normal or 
cautious driver will. Both controllers are tuned to be slightly 
over-damped to avoid set-point oscillations. This does not 
preclude the possibility of vehicle dynamic instability (say 
rollover) should drastic maneuvers be executed. However, even 
under most aggressive cases, the generated lane change 
trajectories do not lead to rollover, largely due to the range of 
parameters selected for vehicle characteristics in this study. 
C. Vehicle Dynamics 
We consider a two-wheel vehicle model as depicted in Figure 
1. 
 
Figure 1. Planar view of vehicle in motion. 
The vehicle model is given as 
 
(1.) 
 
(2.) 
where r  is the yaw rate, vlat the lateral velocity of the vehicle, 
m the mass of the vehicle, Iz the moment of inertia, vlong the 
longitudinal velocity, θ the vehicle heading, lf, lr the distances 
between the front/rear wheel and its center of mass, and Cαf , 
Cαr the front/rear cornering stiffness values. Other variables are 
evident in the figure. 
D. Driver’s Manipulation of the Vehicle 
To generate proper acceleration/deceleration and steering 
angle, we use two independent controllers for longitudinal and 
lateral control of the vehicle in a manner that we believe to be 
consistent with human driving. Both controllers (Proportional 
plus Derivative or PD) are used to control the relative velocity 
or the headway and the steering angle. The longitudinal control 
output, the resultant acceleration, is determined by the weighted 
mean of the two controls of the relative velocity and the 
headway. Both control outputs are limited by physical 
constraints of the vehicle and the driver’s disposition (say 
aggressiveness as further elaborated below). In particular, an 
aggressive/inattentive driver may move more drastically in the 
longitudinal and lateral directions than a normal or cautious 
driver. Thus, the vehicle acceleration a is given by 
   (3.) 
where ev,d is the error between the reference velocity and the 
velocity of the vehicle or the error between the reference 
relative distance and the relative distance between the given 
vehicle and the vehicle ahead, Kpg is the proportional gain of the 
longitudinal controller, Kdg is the derivative gain of the 
longitudinal controller, gl is the acceleration limit that can be 
changed by the driver’s disposition, and gpl is the physical 
limitation of acceleration or deceleration. Likewise, the steering 
angle is defined by 
   (4.) 
where elat is the error between the reference lateral position and 
the lateral position of the vehicle, Kpl is the proportional gain of 
the lateral controller, Kdl is the derivative gain of the 
longitudinal controller, δlat is the steering angle limit that can be 
altered by the driver’s disposition, and δpl is the physical 
limitation of the steering angle. Here, δlat can be obtained by 
using the following ratio which is known as lateral acceleration 
gain [50]: 
   (5.) 
where ayl denotes the lateral acceleration limit that can be 
changed by the driver’s disposition (again, say aggressiveness 
as further discussed in the sequel), L is the wheelbase, Kus is the 
understeer gradient of the vehicle, and g is the acceleration of 
gravity. 
E. Collision detection 
 Vehicles are assumed as rectangles that have certain 
widths and lengths. Thus, in the simulations, collision between 
any two vehicles can be detected in terms of the overlapping 
area between the projections of these rectangles using the 
Separating Axis Theorem [51] as depicted in Figure 2.  
To formulate an index  to represent the collision 
possibility, we use the gaps between two rectangles along the 
separating axis. 
  (6.) 
where Dproj denotes the gaps along the separating axis, vi a 
vector defining the rectangle, and v the vector to the opposite 
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corner. We the define the collision possibility index, 
, as the exponential inverse of the gap. 
  (7.) 
where 
 . (8.) 
 is defined in a similar manner. Note that the collision 
possibility index is 1 when two rectangles overlap and 0 when 
the gap between them approaches infinity. 
 
 
Figure 2. Schematic view of Separating Axis Theorem. 
III. GAME THEORETIC FORMULATION  
A. Game Definition 
We configure a straight road with three lanes as the smallest 
meaningful traffic setting for this purpose. This setting offers 
three basic choices: changing lane to the left, going straight, and 
changing lane to the right. No lane preference is assumed 
although this can be incorporated in the model. We assume the 
road to be occupied by two kinds of vehicles: vehicles that 
incorporate decision makers or have intentions and vehicles that 
follow given set paths at set speeds. The latter vehicle act as 
props and construct the boundary of the simulation. 
B. Game Formulation 
In the present study we formulate a game with three players 
as depicted in Figure 3: the vehicle itself, serving as the lead 
vehicle and the two follower vehicles in the two adjacent lanes. 
This implies that the subject vehicle does not attempt to 
influence the vehicles ahead but does survey the presence of 
these vehicles for decision-making purposes. The Stackelberg 
game is therefore defined as a three-person finite game with 
three levels of hierarchy: 
 
 
 
 
where P1 designates the leader in the specific game (with its 
boundaries defined in Figure 3 instance), P2 the nearest 
follower (which may also act as a leader in a subordinate game 
involving P2 and P3) and P3 as the second follower to P1 (or 
as the direct follower to P2, should P2 consider a lane change 
to the right as part of its subordinate game with P1; L1 the lane 
number of the leader, and Γ1,2,3 the actions: i.e. going left, L, 
going straight, S, and going right, R.  
Moreover, the game is considered to be dynamic, in the sense 
that the payoffs corresponding to the respective strategies 
change as a function of the driving situation. In other words, 
and as we shall see shortly, the payoffs or utility functions are 
functions of the inter-vehicular distances and velocities and as 
such dynamically change. However, the decision to initiate a 
lane-change depends on these payoffs, and in turn reflects the 
traffic state (including the respective velocities) at the time the 
lane-change decision is made. 
 
Figure 3. Schematic of 3-player Stackelberg game. 
We do assume that vehicular velocities do not radically and 
abruptly change over the short temporal horizon in which the 
respective lane-change occurs. This presents a certain limitation 
of our approach, which ignores intentional or unintentional 
abrupt changes in the behaviors of the drivers (beyond what is 
expected based on their presumed level of 
aggressiveness/inattentiveness), and further reflects the fact that 
our attribution of aggressiveness/inattentiveness is 
dispositional and not temporal. In other words, temporally short 
behavioral changes are not considered in this work; neither are 
true distracted driving behaviors that may occur over a short 
time-frame. 
We should also point out that in our work (and to our 
knowledge different from most, if not all related studies) 
players do not share their payoff matrices. This implies that 
each player may have a different perspective on the game in 
which s/he is involved, and each player may perceive its 
optimal strategy in a way that may or may not be exactly the 
same as the way in which other players view theirs. This also 
means that any other vehicles may also consider the subject 
vehicle as a player in a different game and respond to the subject 
vehicle’s actions in that context. While this adds certain level 
of realism to the proposed approach, it also implies that 
attributed best decision by one player may indeed be different 
from that which is perceived (for the same player) by others. 
This fact itself implies a more subtle theoretical nuance vis-à-
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vis the notion of game equilibrium as it is traditionally 
attributed to the Stackelberg game model, and which requires 
further investigation. However, as we have stated at the outset, 
our study’s emphasis has been on developing an intuitively 
realistic model as we work to explore the theoretical basis for 
variations from non-standard formulation of the Stackelberg 
game theory. 
C. Utility design 
We define two complementary utility functions related to 
two of the factors that Gipps [12] has considered; speed 
advantage and unacceptable collision risk. These utility 
functions incorporate the driver aggressiveness, via an index, q, 
as an important element that affects driving behavior and traffic 
safety [22].  If the driver is completely aggressive or inattentive, 
the index q is 1 (or 100%.) If the driver is normal, q is 0.5 (or 
50%), and if the driver is completely cautious, or attentive, q is 
0 (0%.) As noted here, the use of an aggressiveness index is also 
intended to reflect the human driver’s inattentiveness as well as 
willfully aggressive driving [52-54]. 
1. Utility associated with headway 
Since the focus of this work is on discretionary lane-changing 
behavior, we assume that drivers wish to maintain an 
appropriate headway while moving at their desired speed. Thus 
we define as: 
	 (9.) 
where dr  is the headway distance (relative distance between the 
subject vehicle and the vehicle ahead), dv denotes the visibility 
distance for a normal driver; α(q) modifies dv as a function of 
driver aggressiveness/inattentiveness. There is no unique 
choice in this case as attribution of aggressiveness or 
inattentiveness may lead one to use a decreasing or increasing 
function α(q) based on context. Aggressive or inattentive driver may tailgate persistently requiring a decreasing α(q) or, as least 
in the case of some aggressive drivers, may demand a larger 
headway, leading to an increasing α(q). Aside from this point, 
this utility measure can be quantified relative to the current lane 
or relative to any target lane to the left or right side of the current 
lane as further discussed below. 
2. Utility reflecting lane-change  
We include a utility function that reflects the feasibility of a 
lane-change in view of possible collision with a competing 
vehicle in the target lane, 
 
is defined as 
	 (10.) 
where dr denotes the relative distance between the subject and 
competing vehicles, vr the respective relative velocity, T the 
prediction time as a monotonically decreasing function of q and 
Dsuf the distance required to conduct the lane-change: i.e. a 
multiple of the diagonal length of the subject vehicle. 
3. Total utility 
For each player we define the total utility as: 
	 (11.) 
The utility of staying in a given lane is clearly only due to 
headway in that lane since  would be zero for this case. In 
considering a lane-change, however,  would generally be 
nonzero per the definition of this term in the previous section 
and possibly negative if the driver is cautious with an 
appropriately large prediction time, T. This could in principle 
prevent a lane change in the case of cautious drivers as it is later 
seen in the results section of this paper. On the other hand, for 
an aggressive driver, the impact of this term could be minimally 
negative or perhaps even positive (although in practice that is 
rare unless the competing vehicle in the target lane is 
sufficiently behind.) This would lead to a higher possibility of 
a lane change in this case as noted in Section IV. 
D. Driver Reaction and Limitation of Perception 
Driver reaction time and poor prediction of other vehicles’ 
actions are crucial factors in transportation [55-58]. To consider 
these issues, we consider a degradation factor due to delayed 
recognition of the presence of other vehicles and late reaction 
to these. This is implemented by changing the decision maker’s 
recognition point that is used to assess lane intrusion as depicted 
in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4.  Boundary recognition response. 
It is assumed that the magnification ratio of the rectangle 
around the protruding vehicle would vary with respect to 
aggressiveness/inattentiveness. In addition, if the driver is 
attentive, the lane transition is identified when the closest front 
corner of the vehicle meets the set criterion. If the driver is 
inattentive/aggressive, it is assumed that the recognition point 
is near the planar center of the protruding vehicle. In other 
words, a cautious/attentive driver is mindful of lane intrusions 
while an aggressive or inattentive driver “barrels” through, as it 
were, less concerned about the potential risk of collision. 
E. Solution of the Stackelberg Game 
Clearly, appropriate action should be chosen among the final 
utility pairs in order to simulate the driver’s behavior. Since 
every vehicle follows the Stackelberg game, the solution (γ1*, 
γ2*, γ3*) of the game is obtained by the following 3-person 
Stackelberg equilibrium equations [59] with the designed utility 
values, 
 
 
 
where U1, U2, and U3 denote the respective utilities of the leader 
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and the follower vehicles, keeping in mind that there is a 
priority order among the followers as discussed in Section III.B; 
γ1 is the possible action of the leader; γ2 and γ3 are respective 
reactions of the followers. Every two-person finite Stackelberg 
game admits a strategy for the leader [59], which can be 
extended to the three-person finite Stackelberg game with three 
levels of hierarchy because it can be understood as two 
successive two-person games given that the interaction among 
the leader and its first follower can place the latter in the 
position of being the leader in a game with the second follower. 
The set of γ3, S3, is first obtained as the argument of the 
maximum payoff for the follower with respect to γ1 and γ2. In 
turn, γ2 is obtained in the same manner for a given γ1 with the 
consideration of the follower’s reaction. Since the follower’s 
(the second player against the first leader and the follower 
against the first and second leaders) payoff is unique but the 
strategy is not necessarily unique [59], we establish an order 
among the strategies that have the same payoffs, such that the 
driver chooses “going straight” if the payoffs of “going 
straight” and “changing lanes” are the same, and the driver in 
the second lane chooses the first lane when the first and third 
lanes offer the driver the same payoffs. 
Thus, every possible γ1 has the accompanying unique 
reactions of the second leader and the follower. Accordingly, 
 and  are determined as the 
optimal strategies of the second leader and the follower 
corresponding to γ1* and the pair (γ1*, γ2*), respectively. In 
simple terms, the driver in our proposed model predicts the two 
followers’ responses and chooses the best strategy based on that 
prediction. This is essential to the notion of Stackelberg game 
theory and from our perspective applicable to discretionary lane 
changing. In other words, the driver considering the lane change 
serves as the lead decision maker or lead player while 
considering the actions of the competing vehicles in the 
adjacent lanes in selecting his/her optimal decision.  Note that 
since every driver has his/her own Stackelberg game-based 
decision model and does not share the utilities, the best 
responses for the followers are not guaranteed. This is in 
important point, and as we have stated earlier, may present 
certain theoretical challenges, but adds realism to the modeling 
process. 
F. Schematic Presentation of the Game 
Since the game has a strategy space that is difficult to 
visualize, it is necessary to design a matrix-like formulation that 
is composed of lanes and players; i.e. the vehicles. In Figure 5, 
the rows designate the hierarchy among the players and the 
columns show the probable lane selections. The figure depicts 
the case when P1, P2 and P3 choose R, R, and S respectively as 
their strategies and the utilities are determined by their physical 
longitudinal positions. 
Every strategy combination is marked on the matrix by 
laterally changing the players’ lanes. Since we defined a game 
that has three highway lanes, the left side, CL, of the leftmost 
lane and the right side, CR, of the rightmost lane are assumed to 
be areas where changing lanes is impossible, such as the 
centerline and the road shoulder. Therefore, vehicles have the 
least payoffs for the strategies that make them enter these areas. 
In addition, since the human driver’s visibility is bounded by 
physical limitation, the vehicles beyond the visibility distance 
are not considered. Figure 5 represents one possible strategy 
pair in the strategy space. As we can see on the left side of the 
figure, the strategy pair is not likely to lead to better payoffs for 
P1, rather than the payoffs of other strategy pairs. In other 
words, what is skteched here is for illustration purposes and 
does not necessarily reflect the final (optimal) decision of the 
subject vehicle. 
I. SIMULATIONS 
A. Unit Test Scenarios 
We tested a specific scenario consisting of two vehicles in 
addition to the three front dummy vehicles that form the 
boundary of the simulation area as depicted in Figure 6. As 
stated earlier, every two-person finite Stackelberg game admits 
a strategy for the leader [59], which can be extended to the 
three-person finite Stackelberg game with three levels of 
hierarchy because it can be understood as two successive two-
person games. As a result, and to focus on the task at hand, 
which is qualitative assessment or validation of the overall 
algorithm, we consider the simpler case shown in the figure. 
 
Figure 5. Matrix-space formulation of the driving game. 
 
Figure 6.  Unit test scenario. 
The purpose of the scenario is to focus on the interaction 
between two vehicles when they use the Stackelberg game-
theoretic decision model. Vehicles are assumed to travel in the 
direction of the Y-axis, and the lanes are set in direction of the 
X-axis of the coordinate frame depicted in the figure; Lane 1 
(x=0 m), Lane 2 (x=3.3m), and Lane 3 (x=6.6m). There are two 
initial settings for the vehicles. We set the initial positions, 
velocities, and the drivers’ dispositions for every vehicle to 
determine the impact of the driver’s disposition in conjunction 
with the design of the aforementioned utility functions. One 
vehicle in the third lane, among the front prop vehicles, is 
located slightly ahead in order to bring about a lane-change for 
2* 2 1*( )Sg gÎ 3* 3 1* 2*( ; )Sg g gÎ
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the subject vehicle in each case. Vehicles 1 and 2 are initially 
in the second and third lanes, respectively. In order to test the 
lane-change situation when there is a fast approaching vehicle, 
Vehicle 2 is located 50 m behind Vehicle 1, but with a higher 
velocity. This is stated in Table 1. 
Four aggressiveness combinations are tested for Vehicles 1 
and 2. These represent the interactions of two normal drivers, 
an aggressive driver and a cautious driver, two aggressive 
drivers, and two cautious drivers, in that order. 
Table 1. Initial positions of test scenarios  
(x0: initial lateral, y0: initial longitudinal.) 
 
Initial Conditions 
x0 (m) y0 (m) v0 (m/s) 
Vehicle1 3.3 0 100 
Vehicle2 6.6 -50 130 
B. Unit test results 
The unit test results are shown in Figure 7 through Figure 10. 
The two-normal-drivers test case, depicted in Figure 7 and the 
two-aggressive-drivers test case, depicted in Figure 9 show that 
the driver of Vehicle 1 in the second lane changes its lane to the 
third lane, which initially has a larger space in front, and then 
Vehicle 2 changes its lane to the second lane because its free 
space is now restricted by Vehicle 1. While the pattern of these 
transitions is similar, Figure 9 shows that the aggressive 
drivers’ lane-changes happen sooner than the normal drivers’ 
as depicted in Figure 7. This leads to a distinct rise in the 
collision possibility index (shown in solid blue) relative to the 
threshold (shown in a dashed red line.) 
 
Figure 7. Unit test for two normal drivers 
In Figure 8 the cautious driver of Vehicle 2 does not try to 
overtake the aggressive driver and maintains a safer relative 
distance. In Figure 10, with the combination of two cautious 
drivers, no driver changes lanes.  
In all, the most dangerous instant appears in Figure 9. The 
reason for this result is that the more aggressive/inattentive the 
drivers are, the less mindful they are of the presence of vehicles 
in the target lane. Conversely, if one driver is cautious, even 
though the other is aggressive, as in Figure 8, their collision 
possibility remains relatively low. 
 
Figure 8. Unit test for aggressive and cautious drivers 
While these appear to be intuitively valid, they do not tell the 
whole story as it were since in more congested setting the 
interactions can be correspondingly more complex as discussed 
below. 
C. Monte Carlo Simulation 
To determine the general effects of 
aggressiveness/inattentive driving, we performed a Monte 
Carlo simulation involving randomized longitudinal positions 
and constructed a model to estimates the collision possibility as 
a function of longitudinal positions and 
aggressiveness/inattentiveness of drivers. We tested 100 cases 
with random longitudinal inter-vehicular distances. The 
longitudinal positions of Vehicles 1 and 2 are uniformly 
distributed in the range of 0 to 50 m and 0 to -50 m, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 9. Unit test for two aggressive drivers 
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Figure 10. Unit test for cautious drivers 
Three aggressiveness/inattentiveness combinations 
(Normal/Normal, Aggressive/Cautious, and 
Aggressive/Aggressive) were considered; the case that both 
drivers are cautious (or timid as denoted in the figure) led to no 
meaningful results.  These results are summarized in Figure 11, 
which shows the collision possibility as a function of driver 
aggressiveness and inter-vehicular distance.  Although the 
highest level of potential collision is different for every test 
case, the trend in collision possibility appears similar to the unit 
test results. This is particularly evident by looking at the right 
side of Figure 11 (inter-vehicular distances larger than 50m), 
where for normal/normal and aggressive/cautious (timid) cases, 
the collision possibility remains low and increases when the 
combinations of drivers are mutually aggressive as it was in the 
unit test studies.  
 
Figure 11. Collision possibility index as a function of driver 
aggressiveness and longitudinal separation. 
As the inter-vehicular distances decrease, there is a general 
trend towards higher collision possibility even when drivers are 
not particularly aggressive (the left side of the graph in Figure 
11.) This appears intuitively reasonable as well. It is also worth 
noting that even when drivers are normal, as the inter-vehicular 
distances decreases, there is a general increase in collision 
possibility as it is evident in the dotted line crossing the span of 
the figure. This trend is even more pronounced in the case of 
aggressive vs. cautious drivers in ways that was not evident in 
the unit-test studies shown earlier. The explanation here is that 
as the inter-vehicular distances decrease, an aggressive driver 
may continue to engage in a rapid lane change but the preceding 
cautious (timid) driver may not react, leading to limited spacing 
between the vehicles in the same lane, and producing a high 
assessment of the collision possibility index. In all, the results 
seem to reflect the qualitative reasonableness of the model.  
D. Microscopic Traffic Simulation 
In this section, the proposed driver decision model is used as 
the basis for a microscopic traffic simulation. To accomplish 
this, we conducted a series of multiple vehicle simulations for 
the evaluation of crash occurrence and cumulative collision 
possibility according to drivers’ aggressiveness/inattentiveness 
combinations. A 200 m section of a three-lane highway was 
simulated as shown in Figure 12. Vehicles enter and leave the 
section on a consistent basis. Thus, the density of traffic in the 
section is maintained. For example, if 10 groups of vehicles 
pass through the section over 1 minute when the density of the 
vehicles is 10 veh/section, the flow rate is 100 veh/min.  
 
Figure 12. Configuration of the traffic flow simulation 
As a semi-quantitative validation measure we compare the 
results of this microscopic simulation with the crash data from 
the so-called NHTSA 100-Car Naturalistic Driving Safety 
dataset [2]. The NHTSA study tracked the behavior of the 
drivers of 100 vehicles equipped with video and other sensors 
for over a year and 2 million miles, producing 42,300 hours of 
data.  The drivers of the vehicles were involved in 82 crashes, 
761 near crashes, and 8,295 critical incidents.  
In order to compare our results with the NHTSA study, a 
crash is assumed to occur in our study when the collision 
possibility index reaches 1. In addition, when the collision 
possibility index exceeds 0.5, a near crash is assumed to occur. 
The density of traffic is 6 veh/section for consistency with the 
NHTSA dataset. In order to perform a comparison we assume 
the inattentive case from the NHTSA study to correspond to our 
model’s aggressiveness level of 75%. The results are listed in 
Table 2. 
TABLE 2. OCCURRENCE OF CRASHES IN MODEL 
Crash type Number of crashes 
Crash (Attentive) 1 
Near Crash (Attentive) 12 
Crash (inattentive) 2 
Near Crash (inattentive) 26 
In order to make sense of these and compare with the 
NHTSA study results, the occurrence of crashes are converted 
to crash rate per MVMT (Million Vehicle Miles Traveled). 
Nevertheless, the results of our model cannot be directly 
compared with the NHTSA (field) data because translation of 
the levels of aggressiveness and near crash possibility threshold 
are evidently based on our selective parametrization.  However, 
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a qualitative comparison shows a certain level of effectiveness 
of the model in assessing the impact of 
aggressiveness/inattentiveness on traffic safety as shown in 
Figure 13. Note in particular that the results of the model have 
a similar level of overapproximation to the field data across the 
various cases considered. 
 
Figure 13. Comparison of crash rate 
The cumulative collision possibility results from our 
microscopic simulation are presented in Figure 14. To evaluate 
the effects of aggressive/inattentive drivers, the ratio of 
aggressive drivers is set to 50% and 100% in the test cases of 
Aggr./Timid and Aggr./Aggr. in Figure 14. Note that 5, 50, 500 
runs of the simulation with the density of 6 veh./section yield 
30, 300, and 3000 vehicle simulations respectively.  
Likewise, 40, 400 and 4000 vehicle simulations result from 
a density of 8 veh/section. Bars in each figure show the 
difference caused by different drivers' aggressiveness 
combinations. It can be seen that aggressiveness combinations 
influence the accumulated collision possibility regardless of the 
number of vehicles. Similar to the previous result, the collision 
possibility shows a growing tendency as the ratio of aggressive 
drivers increases. 
 
Figure 14. Distribution of cumulative collision possibilities 
In addition, when the density of vehicles is higher in Figure 
14 (b) compared with Figure 14 (a), the collision possibility 
increases under every aggressiveness combination, which 
means shorter relative distances escalate the collision 
possibility as also described in the previous subsection. These 
results in general agree with other works that have studied how 
driver aggressiveness and traffic density affects traffic safety 
[18, 22]. 
II. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. Discussion 
In this paper, we developed a Stackelberg game based driver 
reasoning/decision model for discretionary lane changing in 
highway driving with the consideration of driver disposition 
(aggressiveness/inattentiveness) and certain limitations of 
perception. Since Stackelberg game theory can be used to 
demonstrate the human decision making process when the 
event has the structure of a hierarchy, a game theoretic traffic 
simulation based on 3-person Stackelberg game theory and 
simplified vehicle dynamics have been presented in order to 
simulate the human behavior in certain driving situations 
(essentially slightly congested freeway setting). The game 
theoretic model was intended to address the typical decision-
making process on the road where drivers can at best only 
predict other drivers’ behaviors and cannot control them. 
We assumed that every vehicle in the simulation was 
involved in a 3-person game (2-person game when appropriate), 
(a) 
(b) 
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where the given vehicle is the first leader of the game. This is a 
limitation of the model as it stands in that we do not directly 
consider the effect of multiple preceding vehicles in the 
competing lanes although there is a chain of games leading back 
from the subject vehicle so the indirect effect is included. This 
assumption appears reasonable in a light to moderately 
congested traffic settings but will need to be revised in more 
congested situations. 
In order to capture the characteristics of a variety of drivers, 
we presented (the game-theoretic) utility (payoff) designs that 
reflect the drivers’ intentions and are influenced by their 
dispositions (aggressiveness/inattentiveness). From the 
simulation results, we showed that Stackelberg game theory 
played a reasonably effective role in choosing a certain action 
among the possible action sets, much like human reasoning.  
Second, we presented a collision possibility model in terms 
of the drivers’ aggressiveness levels. We further showed that 
the above game theoretic approach to the traffic simulation 
could provide sufficiently explainable demonstrations. The unit 
tests showed plausible results about the interactions of vehicles 
reflecting the impact of driver aggressiveness/inattentiveness 
on the possibility of collision during lane-changing maneuvers. 
Subsequently a compact collision possibility model was 
developed via a limited Monte Carlo simulation, reflecting the 
general result that mutually aggressive combinations can be a 
critical reason for high collision possibilities and smaller inter-
vehicular distances magnifies the collision possibility with 
almost every combination of dispositions.  
A limited traffic micro-simulation further showed the bulk 
effect of a similar trend over a 200m section of a three-lane 
highway with collision possibility showing an upwards trend 
with an increase in traffic density (as well as an increase the 
proportion of aggressive/inattentive drivers.) Likewise, 
comparison of our model with the NHTSA 100-Car 
Naturalistic Driving Safety data set [2] has shown that our 
Stackelberg game based driver decision model can mimic (if 
not perfectly replicate) observation-based results from the 
aforementioned study that traffic safety is influenced by the 
driver’s aggressiveness/inattentiveness.  
B. Conclusions 
As stated at the outset, our intent has been to lay the 
foundation for developing a reasonably intuitive model for 
lane-changing decisions that can be applicable to autonomous 
driving (or advanced driver assist systems capable of executing 
an autonomous lane-changing maneuver.) From the above 
results it does appear that, a Stackelberg game theoretic 
decision model is potentially of value in this context. Clearly, 
such a decision-making model or logic will need to be 
extensively validated in more elaborate simulator and test-track 
studies. However, our preliminary results (as reported 
elsewhere [24]) indicate that this is in principle possible, 
provided the aforementioned decision logic is augmented with 
an effective trajectory optimization scheme (for instance using 
a robust model predictive control strategy) to address the impact 
of uncertainty in the behavior of competing vehicles (as well as 
the physical limitations of the subject vehicle and roadway 
conditions.) This point also raises a potential concern over 
computational complexity of the approach vis-à-vis 
implementation in real-time. In this respect, Stackelberg game 
theory actually offers a potential benefit in that unlike the Nash 
game theory produces a deterministic solution, and 
computationally more tenable in real-time. Combination of 
game theoretic analysis with trajectory optimization does 
present computational challenges, however, but no more than 
model predictive control (a commonly proposed approach in 
this realm) does. All said, however, one needs to be mindful of 
the computational aspects of any decision logic from a practical 
standpoint. 
There are additional limitations in the present work that need 
to be addressed. Among these, addressing the impact of 
uncertainty in perception (beyond what is included in this work) 
is critically important. Drivers as well as autonomous vehicles 
are hindered by uncertainty in assessing the true traffic state due 
to weather, light saturation, color effects, and the like. Including 
these factors will enable the simulation environment and the 
related decision models to be more complex but also more 
realistic. Likewise, assessing the true level of aggressiveness of 
other vehicles is critical in executing appropriate decisions. 
Human drivers assess other drivers’ dispositions (not always 
accurately) through a combination of visual observations and 
internal models of human behavior. In an ongoing work, we 
have developed a learning scheme that captures aspects of this 
but further work is needed in this area.  
Clearly, there are other extensions of the current work that 
can be considered, such as including lane preference (left vs. 
right) in lane-changing and considering the impact of vehicle 
platoons (vehicles in competing lanes acting in unison over 
certain time-windows). We are currently engaged in this 
analysis and will report on the work in the near future but the 
subject domain is open for others to consider. 
Finally, this model needs to be better validated. This is 
important in many respects but also costly. We are presently 
porting the model into a dSpace simulator for more active 
human integration and do intend to perform test-track studies in 
the future although no detailed plans have been developed. 
Such a validation will enable fine tuning of the model and 
adding realism in view of actual data, and would support not 
only development of autonomous vehicle decision models but 
may also be used in developing driving simulation games that 
can be used in driver education campaigns or incorporated in 
bona fide traffic micro-simulation environments to support 
policy analysis in view of traffic safety. 
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